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Abstract 
Theory and field studies have suggested that performance goals in executive 
compensation contracts play a pivotal role in inducing CEO’s effort toward 
organizational goals. I show empirical evidence consistent with the prior literature by 
investigating relationship between performance goal achievement and executive 
compensation. First, CEOs’ major economic incentives are placed on achieving their 
own performance goals rather than analyst earnings forecast, past earnings level, and 
zero-earnings target. Performance goal achievement has greater impact on the size of 
annual non-equity incentive compensation than other key determinants of CEO pay have, 
which include firm size, firm-wide performance as opposed to CEO’s individual 
performance, firm industry, CEO characteristics, and corporate governance score. 
Second, I find that typical relationship between performance goal achievement and CEO 
II 
 
pay is designed nonlinearly ex ante, largely inconsistent with prior theoretical support of 
linear association. Ex post, evidence indicates that CEOs actively respond to 
incremental change in economic incentive around the exact point of meeting 
performance goal and around each threshold along the performance goal achievement 
horizon. Finally, I report the improvement of association between executive pay and 
shareholder wealth (“pay-performance sensitivity”) when CEOs meet performance goals 
and when performance goal achievement level is higher and is within the incentive zone. 
In conclusion, this study reveals the concurrent practice of performance evaluation and 
compensation of CEOs of the largest U.S. companies. Performance goals are important 
control mechanism widely adopted by the corporate boards, and this study posits that the 
mechanism contributes to increase in shareholder wealth. 
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Performance goals serve as key criteria to assess performance and determine 
compensation of corporate chief executive officers (CEOs). Prior literature has 
suggested the important role of performance goals in executive compensation contracts 
in inducing CEO effort toward the organizational goals. Murphy (2001) shows that 
annual CEO bonus is based on performance measured relative to pre-established 
performance standard rather than performance itself. Ittner and Larcker (2001) suggest 
that performance targets are pivotal in evaluating managerial performance as well as 
managers’ selecting action plans. They argue that the important role of performance 
target has been rarely investigated in empirical accounting research largely due to scant 
data. Researchers have examined the roles and implications of performance goals in the 
context of broader compensation literature. Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) use executive 
target bonuses and actual bonuses data to find implications about performance standards 
setting practice. Recently, Anderson, Dekker, and Sedatole (2010) study the adoption of 
a large retailer’s performance goal-based bonus plan and suggest that the plan better 
aligns managers’ pay with their performance. 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires listed companies to 
disclose detailed information of executive compensation in the Compensation 
Disclosure and Analysis (CD&A) section of proxy statements, effective since 2006.
1
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 SEC states that not every performance goal is required to be disclosed, considering possible 
competitive disadvantages from revealing proprietary information (SEC Final Rules 33-8732a, 
2006). This principles-based, often discretionary disclosure standard potentially leads to selection 
bias toward a firm’s decision to publicly report performance goal setting process. Kim and Yang 
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The proxy statements reveal the wide use of performance goals as criteria for top 
management performance evaluation and compensation decision, consistent with prior 
academic literature. As an example, Wal Mart Stores Inc.’s 2013 proxy statement 
clarifies that their annual CEO cash bonuses are “contingent on the degree to which the 
company achieves pre-established performance goals that the CNGC [Compensation, 
Nominating and Governance Committee of the board of directors] determines are 
aligned with the company’s short- and long-term operating and financial objectives.” 
The use of performance goals lead to, they argue, management compensation being 
“heavily weighted towards performance” and “aligned with our [their] key financial 
priorities – growth, leverage, and returns.” As such, I focus on the important role of 
performance goals in affecting management incentive and aligning manager’s and 
shareholders’ interests. Finding of the desired roles played by performance goals will be 
consistent with optimal contracting theory that utilized employment compensation 
contracts to mitigate agency costs that incur from the separation of ownership and 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In this article, I develop the idea that performance goal acts as pivotal 
organizational control mechanism for shareholders (through boards of directors, or more 
directly, compensation committee) to incentivize CEOs to maximize firm value. I begin 
by showing that performance goal achievement level (p-to-g; defined as ratio of actual 
performance level to performance goal level) is a key determinant of annual CEO bonus 
                                                                                                                  
(2012), who explore earnings per share target setting using the similar corporate proxy disclosure 
as this study, test for selection bias. They tabulate that Heckman’s selection model does not find 
evidence of selection bias. 
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compensation, after controlling for standard economic factors, corporate governance, 
and other related components of CEO pay.
2
 The impact of performance goal 
achievement on the magnitude of annual CEO bonus is not only statistically and 
economically significant but also stronger than any effects of other factors that have 
been traditionally considered important. Overall, the importance of considering the 
factors has been postulated by three large streams of research. Specifically, optimal 
contracting theories suggest that firm performance is the main driver of management 
compensation. This view is in accordance with standard principal-agent theory, as the 
tight link between performance and pay in turn mitigates agency costs that incur from 
separation of corporate ownership and management. On the other hand, rent extraction 
theories argue that corporate governance has great influence over the size of executive 
compensation. The quality of corporate governance is measured by various factors that 
are related to board composition and ownership structure. Existing evidence is generally 
mixed, and researchers have so far concluded that corporate governance has an 
important effect on management compensation (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; 
Larcker and Tayan, 2011). Lastly, studies in accounting and financial economics have 
found that firm size, CEO age and tenure, beating analyst earnings forecast consensus, 
meeting zero-earnings threshold, and beating prior earnings level all have determining 
                                           
2
 Performance goal achievement is measured in largely two ways: ratio of actual performance to 
performance goal as in this study or actual performance minus performance goal as in Anderson, 
Dekker, and Sedatole (2010) and Holzhacker, Mahlendorf, and Matejka (2013). The ratio method 
is more appropriate in this article’s setting where performance metrics are different by firm and 
year. That is, the second difference method requires unnecessary additional process to scale, say, 
ROA goal achievement of 1% with operating income goal achievement of $1 million. This 
difference method is more appropriate for such settings as proprietary one-firm study with 
identical performance measure across measurement unit. 
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impacts on CEO pay. I find that CEOs have greater economic incentives to achieve their 
own performance goals than to pursue other benchmarks, in order to receive annual 
bonus compensation beyond the target level. As a robustness check, I compare impacts 
of performance goal achievement, beating analyst forecast consensus, and beating prior 
earnings level in separate univariate tests, and find the same results as in the previous 
multivariate panel data tests. Furthermore, I conduct common factor analysis to address 
multicollinearity concern from including numerous potentially correlated dependent 
variables in a regression model. The results also show the strongest impact on annual 
non-equity compensation from performance goal achievement factors, consistent with 
the main findings. 
I then focus on the nonlinearity of typical executive compensation contract. 
First, I show that the fact that a CEO has achieved the performance goals leads to a 
disproportionate increase in bonus relative to slightly missing the performance goals. 
This finding indicates that CEOs have particular interest in meeting the performance 
goal, as originally intended by compensation contracts. Second, Healy (1985), 
Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995), and Dechow (2006) suggest that CEO bonus 
contracts often have three thresholds, namely the lower bound, performance target, and 
upper bound. They posit that CEOs receive no bonus when performance is below lower 
bound, performance-matched bonus between the lower bound and upper bound 
surrounding the performance target (“incentive zone”), and capped bonus when 
performance is above and beyond the upper bound. Using the relatively large actual 
executive compensation contracts of the largest U.S. companies, I find a few differences. 
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Many CEOs are paid some bonuses even when they fail to meet the lower bound. 
Likewise, many CEOs are paid bonuses higher than the maximum target bonuses for 
beating the upper bound. In sum, typical compensation contracts are in fact more 
consistent with the pay-for-performance argument than many have expected. CEOs are 
rewarded for their achievement of performance goals even when the achievement level 
is too low (below the lower bound) or too high (above the upper bound). 
Having found that CEOs are compensated by their performance goal 
achievement and that performance goals play such a pivotal role in executive 
compensation contracts, I next examine the idea that use of performance goals in 
executive compensation contract and achieving performance goals enhance the 
association between CEO pay and shareholder wealth, as prior literature and corporate 
proxy statements in practice suggest. I test this hypothesis with standard pay-
performance sensitivity model in the intersection with performance goal achievement. In 
particular, following traditional approach (e.g., Faleye, 2007; Yermack, 1996), I use 
Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) pay-performance sensitivity models and add to the model 
interaction term between variety of variables with regard to performance goal 
achievement and change in shareholder wealth. I report the improvement of pay-
performance sensitivity when CEOs meet performance goals and when performance 
goal achievement level is higher and within the incentive zone. This suggests that 
performance goals induce CEO effort toward organizational goals, which results in 
shareholder wealth enhancement. 
In conclusion, CEOs’ annual incentive bonuses are determined by the level of 
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performance goal achievement, in line with what most large U.S. companies claim in 
their proxy disclosure. This practice leads to placing CEOs’ economic interest on 
achieving their performance goals that were pre-established by board of directors who 
presumably represents shareholders’ best interest. In other words, performance goals 
play an important role in aligning management’s interest with shareholders’ interest and, 
consequently, in mitigating agency costs that arise from the separation of corporate 
ownership and management. The findings extend traditional frameworks of optimal 
contracting theory by incorporating the relatively underdeveloped but important role of 
executive performance goal setting in overall compensation contract. 
Remainder of the article is organized as follows. I first review prior literature 
that relates with my study in Section 2. Then, I develop hypotheses based on the related 
literature in Section 3. In Section 4, I provide sample collection process and descriptive 
statistics of the unique dataset. In Section 5, I develop empirical models and analyze 
findings from the models. Section 6 concludes the manuscript with suggestion of further 
investigation into the research questions. 
 
2. Related Literature 
(1) Alignment of manager and shareholder interests 
Shareholders of corporations delegate their decision management and decision control to 
board of directors, and in turn, board of directors delegates most of decision 
management to top management and reserves decision control rights that include hiring, 
rewarding, and firing of chief executive officer (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Many prior 
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studies have addressed agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and 
control in corporations and suggested that managerial incentive compensation can be 
used as a key instrument to effectively align managers’ economic interest with that of 
shareholders. In particular, rewarding managers for their effort of increasing 
shareowners’ wealth, or namely the pay-for-performance compensation design, 
effectively mitigates agency costs in principal-agent models by, for example, granting 
responsibility to managers or curbing managerial behaviors that are costly to the firm 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, 2008). Likewise, 
granting long-term incentive contracts to align manager’s interest with that of 
shareholders ex ante is a common solution to incomplete compensation contracts for 
managers with agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this article, I examine 
the role of executive performance evaluation in CEO annual bonus compensation and 
show that performance evaluation process plays a significant role in effectively aligning 
managers’ interest with that of shareholders. 
(2) Pay-for-performance 
Two large bodies of compensation research postulate different views regarding pay-for-
performance (Edmans and Gabaix, 2009). Traditional body of economic research shows 
that managers generally are rewarded for exerting effort that leads to increase in 
shareholder wealth. To begin with, Jensen and Murphy (1990) estimate that CEO wealth 
changes $3.25 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. They interpret the low estimate 
as the evidence of inefficient incentive contracts and the result of ongoing political 
pressure on high level of executive pay. Hall and Liebman (1998), using a more recent 
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dataset, find stronger pay-performance sensitivity and suggest that increase in executive 
stock options grant almost entirely drives the tighter relationship between firm 
performance and executive compensation. By suggesting the new evidence, they 
contradict the claim that the little link between performance and pay, such as one in 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), is interpreted as the inefficiency of extant CEO 
compensation contracts. In a similar vein, Haubrich (1994) shows that the low pay-
performance sensitivity is not necessarily inconsistent with the optimal contracting 
theory in case CEO is risk-averse. 
In part to provide explanation to such weak pay-performance sensitivity and 
the contemporary excessive CEO pay, critics of optimal contracting view have argued 
that due to malfunctioning corporate governance system CEOs have much power over 
their board of directors and the managerial power significantly influences the process of 
setting executive compensation contracts. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and Bebchuk, Fried, 
and Walker (2002) contend that many corporate governance systems do not operate 
properly. They collectively argue that powerful CEOs set their own compensation in 
excess of what standard optimal contracting theory may suggest. In addition, Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2001) report that CEO pay is often granted by luck and this “paid for 
luck” practice is more severe in the firms with poorer corporate governance. Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find an inverse relationship between corporate 
governance and the level of management compensation. They show significant role of 
corporate governance in explaining the cross-sectional variation of CEO compensation 
after controlling for the standard economic factors that have traditionally been found to 
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affect the level of CEO compensation. In sum, evidence of management rent extraction 
theory argues that many corporate boards fail in effective alignment of manager and 
shareholder interests, and as a consequence, executives extract undue rents from the firm 
often in the form of compensation package. 
Collectively, extant literature develops on the premise that executives are 
rewarded for their effort and the consequent performance. However, researchers also 
tend to agree that part of CEO compensation is unlikely to be explained by the economic 
contribution to the firm value. Many argue that the majority of the missing part is 
explained by managerial power and rent extraction incentives, often due to poor 
corporate governance. Some, on the other hand, argue that CEO’s personal, often 
unobservable talent as opposed to hard work as well as institutional factors, e.g., change 
in financial reporting standard which starts to treat executive stock options as costs, all 
take part in determining executive compensation (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Carter, 
Lynch, and Tuna, 2007). In this article, I focus on an underdeveloped determinant of 
CEO annual bonus compensation, namely the performance target achievement, and 
show that this measure of executive performance has the most direct association with 
CEO incentive compensation. 
(3) Performance goal in managerial compensation contract 
While researchers have collectively suggested that economic factors, corporate 
governance, and other personal or institutional factors determine executive 
compensation, one of the most underdeveloped yet important components of 
compensation contract that affects selection of manager actions and evaluation of 
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performance is CEO individual performance goal (Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Murphy, 
2001). And the level of achievement of performance goals, namely the performance-to-
goal measure (“p-to-g”) has been excluded from the discussion of pay and performance 
relationship, largely due to unavailable empirical data. However, there are notable 
exceptions. Murphy (2001) investigates the largely ignored but important determinant of 
annual bonuses, namely the performance standards. He argues that bonuses are not 
based on performance measures per se but on “performance measured relative to a 
performance standard (Murphy, 2001, p. 246).” He finds that firms employing internal 
budget-based performance standards have different bonus payouts and earnings 
smoothing than the firms using externally-determined standards such as peer groups and 
cost of capital. Merchant and Manzoni (1989) reveal from interviews with corporate 
managers that, unlike textbook prescriptions of less-than-50-percent chance of budget 
targets, budgets in practice are met most times and more surprisingly, this high 
performance target achievability is intended by both supervisors and managers. They 
argue that the target-setting process is “a bargaining process between parties whose 
incentives are, in the vast majority of cases, well aligned (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989, 
p. 547).” 
More recently, Anderson, Dekker, and Sedatole (2010), using proprietary field 
data of a U.S. retailer’s sales and sales goals, argue that managers meet but not beat their 
sales targets and prior actual performance affects next goal levels. Their study is 
conducted under the premise that “bonus plans typically pay for performance relative to 
a goal (Anderson, Dekker, and Sedatole, 2010, p. 90),” which reassures the importance 
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of investigating managerial compensation contract in the context of performance and 
performance target. Indjejikian, Matejka, Merchant, and Van der Stede (2014) find that 
firms base their managers’ bonuses on the achievement of performance targets that are 
set to incorporate the managers’ past actual performance but only to a limited extent, in 
consistent with theoretical benefits of having such incentive contracts. 
In conclusion, although researchers have found numerous evidence of what 
affects executive incentive compensation, only a few recent works explore the role of 
performance target setting process in managerial compensation contracts. These few 
studies exploit private samples that often consist of departments within a single firm or 
are based on survey results. Therefore, it is meaningful to examine a wider cross-
sectional time-series dataset of public firms, even merely to find whether existing results 
are replicated (Indjejikian, Matejka, and Schloetzer, 2014). Furthermore, I combine the 
two streams of research, one in performance target setting and the other in executive 
pay-performance sensitivity, to develop novel hypotheses in this article. 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
From the pay-for-performance perspective, executives are paid according to their 
performance that is often measured as financial performance metrics. This logic is 
precisely what prior literature in executive compensation follows. As a consequence, the 
large body of financial economic studies (the optimal contracting view) suggests that 
firm’s stock performance and operating performance determine the level of CEO pay 
(e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Murphy, 1999). They generally find that 
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executive compensation is tied to firm performance. By contrast, literature in corporate 
governance and law (the managerial power view) argues that CEOs exert their power 
over the board of directors to set their own pay (e.g., Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002). 
Thus, proxies for agency costs and measures of corporate governance are factored into 
the function of executive compensation. 
Accounting literature has shown that CEO’s own economic incentives play a 
role in setting the amount of his bonuses. Meeting or beating analyst consensus earnings 
forecast is positively associated with executive pay level (Matsunaga and Park, 2001; 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). Executives receive larger compensation when they beat 
zero earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). In addition, sustaining or improving from 
the last fiscal year’s earnings is another factor that affects the level of CEO pay 
(Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999). These factors share a common theme that they 
are related to CEO’s individual incentives to earn bonuses. These studies are meaningful 
to examine the more direct impact of incentive compensation contracts on executive 
behaviors. However, they also share another common feature that all the factors are 
assumed to be a CEO’s priority concern regardless of the status of the firm performance. 
For example, CEOs of profitable companies may not consider meeting zero earnings or 
prior earnings to be their achievement to secure the annual bonuses. 
In this manuscript, I hypothesize that CEO’s own performance target 
achievement is associated with annual bonus level. I predict that the association is 
positive and strong. I further examine the idea that the positive association between 
CEO’s own performance target achievement and the annual bonus level is stronger than 
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the relationships between other factors and the executive pay level, based on the 
hypothesis that CEO has the most direct and strongest incentives to meet his individual 
performance targets rather than any other performance criteria that are either corporate-
wide or externally-determined. 
H1: CEO’s performance goal achievement is positively associated with the annual non-
equity incentive compensation. 
 
Prior research suggests that ex ante, typical compensation contract involves nonlinearity 
in the compensation and performance goal relationship. That is, under the typical bonus 
contract, no bonus is paid until CEOs meet the lower bound, minimum bonus is paid 
when they meet the lower bound, target bonus is paid when they exactly achieve the 
performance goal, and limited maximum bonus is paid when they beat the upper bound 
of the contract. Murphy (2001), Dechow (2006), Healy (1985), and Holthausen, Larcker, 
and Sloan (1985) show such evidence using proprietary small sample data. I first 
examine whether the large sample actual compensation contracts support the prior 
findings. I then investigate whether the contract works as designed by the board ex post. 
In doing so, I develop the hypothesis that managers have different incentives along the 
nonlinear compensation contract. 
H2: CEO’s performance goal achievement is nonlinearly associated with the annual 
non-equity incentive compensation. 
 
Existing research in pay-performance sensitivity suggests largely mixed evidence of 
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efficiency of executive compensation. Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that pay-
performance sensitivity is low. However, Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that increasing 
use of executive stock and stock option grant contributes to the growth of pay-
performance sensitivity in the more recent period. Despite the discrepancy, and more 
important, the difficulty of interpreting the estimates, the pay-performance sensitivity 
analysis is advantageous to directly examine the CEO’s sharing rate of shareholder value 
creation (Murphy, 1999). Accordingly, many researchers have tested the pay-
performance sensitivity models in varying forms (e.g., Himmelberg and Hubbard, 2000; 
Perry and Zenner, 2001; Faleye, 2007; Yermack, 1996). 
In a similar vein, I hypothesize that when CEO’s performance goal 
achievement is taken into account to the pay-performance sensitivity analysis, the 
relationship between the executive pay and shareholder wealth will become stronger. To 
capture the effect of performance target achievement on pay-performance sensitivity, I 
include an interaction term between change in shareholder wealth and CEO performance 
target achievement measures in the model. The coefficient of the interaction term will be 
the indicator of asymmetric pay-performance sensitivity in case of meeting or failing to 
meet CEO’s performance target. Specifically, I predict the coefficient is positive, which 
indicates that CEO pay is more related to the CEO’s contribution to shareholder wealth 
growth when he achieves performance target. The findings will shed light on the 
literature in asymmetric pay-performance sensitivity. Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman (2006) 
report that sensitivity of CEO cash compensation and stock return is twice greater when 
the stock return is negative than positive. Dechow (2006) discusses the paper and argues 
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that different elements of compensation package, i.e., cash bonus versus equity 
compensation, will result in different asymmetries in pay-performance sensitivity. Shaw 
and Zhang (2010), however, find no significant evidence of such penalty to poorly-
performing CEOs, based on refinement of the classification of firm stock returns. They 
partition the firm stock return and accounting earnings into three segments, high, low, 
and average, respectively, and show that there is no asymmetrically stronger pay-
performance sensitivity for low-performing CEOs. These studies provide a number of 
further research opportunities, and among them is to use even more refined measure of 
CEO performance that truly captures whether the CEO’s performance achieved the 
target that was granted by board of directors who assumes the major responsibility of 
monitoring the managers. 
H3: CEO’s performance goal achievement increases the sensitivity of change in 
executive compensation and change in shareholder wealth. 
 
4. Sample Collection and Data Description 
Effective since December 15, 2006, Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
required companies to disclose detailed information of executive and director 
compensation in the Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (CD&A) section of proxy 
statements. The new disclosure rules intend to provide investors with clearer and more 
complete picture of top executive compensation contracts in an effort to prevent 
executives from setting their own pay excessively high and to encourage BOD to 
monitor management compensation more actively (Faulkender and Yang, 2013). SEC 
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also recommends firms that they disclose the executives’ performance goals and actual 
performance for each performance metric. 
I hand-collect S&P 500 CEOs’ actual compensation contracts from each firm’s 
annual proxy statements over five consecutive years from 2008 to 2012.
3
 Then, the 
collected data are matched with corporate accounting and financial data obtained from 
Compustat, stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
executive compensation data from Compustat Execucomp, and analyst forecast earnings 
data from I/B/E/S. 
Potential concerns may arise with regard to my dataset. First, I collaborate on 
coding the data with a researcher who shares similar understanding and knowledge in 
management compensation and performance evaluation literature. We establish and 
follow coding schemes and, after completing the coding process, we cross-check the 
soundness of collected data. By doing so, I ensure both stability (“intra-rater reliability”) 
and reproducibility (“inter-rater reliability”) of the data (Weber, R.P., 1990, “Basic 
Content Analysis,” second edition, Sage Publications; Stemler, S., 2001, “An Analysis 
of Content Analysis,” Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation). Second, because I 
focus on quantitative data only, i.e., performance goals and actual performance are 
presented numerically, there are few occasions where it is necessary to subjectively 
interpret contents. Finally, to check overall validity of my dataset and to address another 
potential concern of relatively small sample, I replicate the CEO pay-performance 
                                           
3
 S&P 500 market capitalization represents approximately 76% of the total U.S. stock market 
capitalization of all listed firms (S&P 500 market capitalization = US$ 14,199 billion, as of April, 
2013, and the U.S. stock market capitalization = US$ 18,668 billion, source: Standard & Poor’s 
and World Bank statistics). 
17 
 
sensitivity model that has been widely-used in prior literature (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). I find similar evidence as in the prior studies both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, implying that my dataset is not too varied from similar 
studies. 
I exclude sample without p-to-g information, compensation information, and 
firm financial and stock price information. I also exclude financial firms because my 
sample period from 2008 to 2012 coincides with the period when the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) was effective. Financial firms under TARP were subject to tight 
executive pay regulation among others (Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2011). 
Originally, the sample size starts from 2,500 firm-years (500 firms per year over five 
fiscal years). However, after the data cleaning, the size shrinks by about half to 1,295. 
The final sample firm-years have information about at least one performance metric, 
which enables examination of various effects of p-to-g on executive compensation and 
pay-performance sensitivity. In addition, the sample size varies by models and tests, 
depending on numbers of available data for G-Index, CEO ownership, and analyst 
forecast EPS consensus information. Relative to other studies that investigate 
performance target setting arena, however, my paper is benefited by having larger panel 
dataset of the largest U.S. companies over the most recent years. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of performance goals of the sample firm-
years. Panel A shows the sample firms’ use of performance measures in their CEO 
compensation contracts. Specifically, the median number of performance metrics used is 
2, with 50% of weight on the first metric and 33% on the second metric. This indicates 
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the boards’ focus on the first performance metric. Panel B documents what performance 
metrics the firms most use in evaluating their CEOs’ performance. 40% of the first 
performance measures are largely related to earnings per share (EPS), indicating its 
informative importance to corporate executives and shareholders. The second most 
widely-used performance measures are operating income and operating income growth 
rate. The third most used is net income measures, followed by revenue measures and 
earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). This is 
largely because the focal compensation is short-term annual CEO bonuses. The order of 
importance is similar to the second performance metric. However, interestingly, 51% of 
the second performance measures are composed of other measures that include stock 
returns, nonfinancial goals, relative performance evaluation, cost standards, and firm-
specific and executive-specific goals. It implies that boards use the second performance 
metric to complement the first performance measure, mostly financial outcome-related, 
by capturing more qualitative, subjective, and longer-term implications of management 
decision-making and actions. This lends support to the separate body of research in 
relative performance evaluation and nonfinancial performance evaluation (e.g., Ittner, 
Larcker, and Rajan, 1997; Gong, Li, and Shin, 2010; Albuquerque, 2009). Furthermore, 
boards incorporate such long-term perspectives in setting short-term annual bonus 
compensation, consistent with what is suggested by critics of manager’s myopic 
behaviors to maximize short-term profits at the expense of sustainable profits. Lastly, 
Panel C finds that median executives achieve 102% of their performance goal, slightly 
beating their target performance in the case of the first performance metric. 75% of 
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CEOs in the total sample achieve more than 96% of their goal, and the top 25% 
performers attain more than 111% of their goal. The findings confirm the major theme 
that has been explored by researchers in target setting. That is, while theory suggests that 
performance goals should be met less than 50% of times to properly motivate managers, 
in practice, much more than 50% of times performance targets are achieved. Not only do 
managers prefer to have such easy targets, but also are superiors opt to give highly-
achievable targets in order to set realizable goals, prevent managers from boosting 
earnings, and avoid confrontation (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989). My study supports 
the prior literature. The distributions of performance goal achievement are similar across 
first, second, and third performance metric, hence I focus on the first metric that has the 
biggest firm-year size and the least concern for selection. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 illustrates the statistics of my sample data. Panel A shows that the main 
variable of interest in this article, namely the non-equity incentive compensation, 
represents approximately 20% of total executive compensation that consists of salary, 
non-equity incentive bonus, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, Black-
Scholes grant value of stock options, and all other compensation (Himmelberg and 
Hubbard, 2000; Hall and Liebman, 1998).
4
 Cash compensation is the sum of salary and 
non-equity incentives, and constitutes more than 30% of total executive compensation. 
                                           
4
 I find that Execucomp data often misallocate annual incentive bonus into bonus item where, 
after the 2006 SEC disclosure rules, only discretionary bonus should be reported. Instead, the 
rules classify annual incentive bonus as non-equity incentive payout. Firms sometimes report 
annual incentive bonus under the wrong bonus items, and Execucomp does not always correct 
the misclassification. Thus, I use annual incentive bonus data from the actual proxy statements as 
a variable of interest. 
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Panel B and C describe sample firm and CEO characteristics, firm ownership, and 
corporate governance, respectively. In sum, the average sample firm manages $26 
billion-worth total assets and earns $20 billion sales revenues a year, reflecting that the 
sample consists of the 500 largest U.S. companies. The average firm’s ROA is 11% and 
market-adjusted annual stock return is 5%. On the other hand, the average sample CEO 
is 56 years old, has been at the current position in the current firm for more than five 
years, and mostly owns less than 1% of outstanding shares of the company. The fact that 
median CEO stock ownership is much less than mean ownership indicates that a few 
outlying controlling shareholders, e.g., founders and founding family members, are 
included in the sample as CEOs. Broadly, findings in Panel B and C are in line with 
most prior studies. Finally, Panel D presents descriptive comparison between meeting 
different thresholds for annual bonus compensation. Meeting performance goals, 
meeting analyst forecast earnings consensus, and meeting prior earnings all similarly 
occur in around 63% of the total sample. Largely because my sample consists of S&P 
500 firms that are likely to avoid loss in income before extraordinary items, more than 
90% of the sample firms earn positive income during the sample period. 
The three seemingly similarly distributed determinants of CEO pay raises 
concern for multicollinearity when all three are included in a single model. To address 
the concern, I conduct common factor analysis as a robustness check (explained in more 
detail in the next section). The result is qualitatively similar to the main findings, 




[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5. Model Development and Empirical Analysis 
I begin by testing univariate relationship between executive compensation and each of 
its determinants. I define executive compensation as log of non-equity incentive 
compensation and log of total compensation. Explanatory variables represent six 
dimensions surrounding the level CEO pay. First group consists of the main variables of 
interest. Performance goal achievement is theoretically and practically the key 
determining factor of non-equity compensation. I expect positive association between 
performance goal achievement and compensation. Second, the main control group 
consists of meeting other goals such as analyst earnings consensus, zero earnings, and 
prior earnings. As suggested in prior research, I predict that each increases with 
compensation. Third group is composed of standard economic factors that determine the 
level of CEO pay. Specifically, firm size is proxied by total assets and sale revenues, 
firm profitability is measured by return on assets and market-adjusted stock return, and 
firm investment and growth perspective is measured by book-to-market ratio. For all but 
the last inverse measure of investment and growth, book-to-market ratio, I predict that 
each is positive related with compensation. Fourth, prior studies suggest two opposite 
relationships between CEO’s ownership and the size of compensation. On the one hand, 
as a CEO with large ownership has more managerial power he may exert undue 
influence over his own compensation decision process and pay himself excessively. On 
the other hand, a CEO with large ownership is more well aligned with shareholders and 
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has less agency costs, hence receives smaller pay packages under the assumption that 
excessive compensation is a signal for management entrenchment. CEO age and tenure 
will likely increase with compensation. The fifth group is about the industry in which 
the firm operates. In particular, I control for regulated and utility firms for their 
executive incentive design is less weighed against performance-related variable pays. 
The last sixth group is the measure of corporate governance. There are two widely used 
governance indexes in the literature. One is the so-called G-Index by Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003), which counts the incidence of 24 takeover defenses and anti-
shareholder rights provisions. The other is the so-called E-Index by Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell (2009), which originates from G-Index and rather focuses on the key six 
components that are found to be the most effective proxy for the corporate governance 
quality. I include both indexes in the sixth group to control for general corporate 
governance. Table 4 reports the results of the univariate test. Most variables indeed have 
their expected signs of coefficients. Some variables lose statistical significance in the 
correlation with total compensation. This is of no surprise, given the descriptive 
evidence that non-equity compensation is approximately only 20% of total 
compensation. Inconsistent with prediction, CEO tenure is negatively related with 
compensation, albeit statistically insignificantly. Overall, with a few exceptions, the 
univariate test results are in line with prior findings. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
As discussed above, different views of executive compensation generate different sets of 
determining factors of CEO pay. The financial economic perspective collectively finds 
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that firm size, investment opportunity or growth, and change in shareholder wealth 
influence CEO compensation (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Cadman, Carter, 
and Hillegeist, 2010; Gabaix and Landier, 2008). On the other hand, ownership structure 
and board composition are regarded as determinant of CEO pay by researchers in 
corporate governance study (Allen, 1981; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; 
Yermack, 1996; Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy, 2013; Hwang and Kim, 2009; 
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002). Others argue that CEO characteristics such as the 
CEOs’ age and tenure and the firm’s industry affect the magnitude of executive pay 
(Milbourn, 2003; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith, 1996). 
My first model tests the impact of performance goal achievement on executive 
incentive compensation after controlling for relevant factors: 
COMPit = β0 + β1P-to-Git + β2D_Meet_Analystit + β3D_Meet_Zeroit + β4D_Meet_Priorit  
+ β5log(Assets)it + β6log(Sales)it + β7BMit + β8ROAit + β9Adj_Retit + β10Ownershipit  
+ β11Ageit + β12Tenureit + β13D_Regulatedit + β14G_Indexit + ΣYear + εit            (1) 
The dependent variable is either natural logarithm of non-equity incentive 
compensation (Core and Guay, 1999; Hall and Liebman, 1998) or ratio of non-equity 
incentive compensation to target bonus. I scale the level of non-equity incentive 
compensation by target bonus, mainly because target bonus is the amount of annual 
bonus CEO receives for achieving exactly the performance goal, and thus is most 
directly related to performance goal achievement. I use other denominators, including 
salary, cash compensation, and total compensation, and find qualitatively similar results 
(untabulated). In addition to P-to-G and the indicator variable for meeting performance 
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goal, I include an interaction term between the two variables, to examine how P-to-G 
contributes to CEO compensation when the CEO meets the performance goal. 
Following prior literature (e.g. Smith and Watts, 1992; Baber, Janakiraman, and 
Kang, 1996; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and 
Murphy, 2013; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist, 2010), I control 
for natural logarithm of total assets (proxy for firm size), book-to-market ratio (reverse 
proxy for investment opportunity), and market-adjusted annual firm stock return (proxy 
for change in shareholder wealth). Gabaix and Landier (2008) argue that market 
capitalization is the most relevant firm size proxy with significantly positive relation 
with total compensation level. However, I do not include market capitalization in my 
model due to failure to find such similar effect. Inclusion of natural logarithm of total 
sales (another proxy for firm size) and return on assets (proxy for corporate profitability) 
does not change the result. Ownership structure of a firm is measured by percentage of 
CEO total shares owned excluding options (Allen, 1981; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 
1999). CEO characteristics that are known to affect the magnitude of compensation are 
executive’s age and the length of tenure as CEO at the firm (Milbourn, 2003; Coughlan 
and Schmidt, 1985). Regulated industries have distinguished features from non-
regulated firms that the executive incentive design has lower components of 
performance-related variable pay (Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith, 1996). G-Index 
proxies for the level of shareholder rights and tends to decrease with firm performance 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). Alternative use of E-Index as proxy for corporate 
governance does not change the reported evidence. This is naturally the case as the two 
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indices are strongly positively correlated (correlation = 67%). I also include additional 
proxies for firm size (natural logarithm of annual net sales) and firm profitability (ROA; 
defined as earnings before interests and taxes divided by annual average total assets), in 
line with prior literature (e.g. Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2008; Faulkender and Yang, 
2010). Year-fixed effects are included to control for year-specific market-wide events 
such as the global financial crisis that remained influential until 2008 and 2009, and the 
sample is two-way clustered by year and firm. 
Table 4 reports the empirical results from model (1). As predicted, P-to-G has 
significantly positive association with executive non-equity incentive compensation in 
column (1) through column (3). The empirical evidence suggests that the major fraction 
of annual CEO bonus is determined by the level of performance with respect to 
performance goal. Furthermore, the coefficients of variables indicate that the impact of 
performance goal achievement on non-equity incentive compensation is prevalent over 
other coefficients of variables that have been suggested as key determinants of CEO pay. 
The coefficient of variable P-to-G is not only statistically significant. The coefficient of 
2.153 in Column (1) is interpreted into the change of non-equity incentive compensation 
by 215% for a one unit increase in P-to-G, when all other variables in the model are held 
constant. In other words, when P-to-G increases by 1% point, the non-equity 
compensation increases by 2.15%. Given that mean non-equity compensation amounts 
to nearly $2,100,000 a year, the 1% point improvement in P-to-G leads to approximately 
$45,000 increase in non-equity compensation. I test the relationship between the three 
traditional determinants and the level of CEO annual bonus. The table shows consistent 
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results with prior literature, verifying the significantly positive association for each of 
three traditional determinants. Then, in column (5), the coefficients of main variables, P-
to-G and (P-to-G)*(d_Meet_Goal), are significantly positive. The two competing 
determinants of executive compensation other than meeting analyst forecast earnings 
consensus indicator have, overall, no significant association with non-incentive 
compensation. Even the meeting analyst forecast variable has significantly lower 
coefficient than P-to-G or (P-to-G)*(d_Meet_Goal) and the coefficient in column (5) are 
significantly reduced from column (4), implying the dominant role of performance 
achievement in determining annual CEO bonus. The increase in R
2
 from column (4) to 
column (5) and (6) is the evidence that much greater fraction of non-equity incentive 
compensation is explained by considering P-to-G. 
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
To examine Hypothesis 2, I include nonlinearity measure of the relationship between 
performance goal achievement and compensation in Model (1), following the design of 
typical compensation contract.  
COMPit = β0 + β1D_Meet_Goalit + β2D_Area1it + β3D_Area2it + β4D_Area4it  
+ β5D_Meet_Analystit + β6D_Meet_Zeroit + β7D_Meet_Priorit + β8log(Assets)it  
+ β9log(Sales)it + β10BMit + β11ROAit + β12Adj_Retit + β13Ownershipit + β14Ageit  
+ β15Tenureit + β16D_Regulatedit + β17G_Indexit + ΣYear + εit                    (2) 
The first measure of nonlinearity, d_Meet_Goal, is included to examine 
whether there is change in managerial incentives surrounding the performance goal. 
Table 5 reports the findings. The positive coefficient of d_Meet_Goal indicates that 
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whether CEO meets her performance goal itself is an important factor to consider for 
compensation committee of BOD in granting CEO annual bonus. This finding provides 
a possible reason to explain the described typical 102% performance achievement level. 
That is, most executives have strong financial incentives in meeting the goal, and even 
slight overachievement can lead to large increase in the amount of year-end bonus. 
Without such threshold or “kink,” CEO will have no incremental incentive to achieve 
performance goal under perfectly linear compensation contract. The model of non-
equity incentive compensation scaled by total assets reports even stronger results as 
prior finding. 
The second measure of nonlinearity is the four different areas along the 
compensation contract design. The typical compensation contract ex ante involves the 
four areas as described in Figure 1. I first examine whether large sample actual 
compensation contracts support the prior field study findings. Then, I investigate 
whether the nonlinear compensation contract works as intended. The findings are 
reported in Column (2) and (4) in Table 5 (unreported results for brevity are qualitatively 
similar when dependent variable is log of total compensation and total compensation 
divided by total assets). As designed, when CEO fails to meet the lower bound her non-
equity compensation significantly decreases compared to when she meets her 
performance goal. If her P-to-G is in Area 2, her bonus is reduced but the economic 
significance is much smaller than when her P-go-G is in Area 1. When CEO beats the 
upper bound, his bonus significantly increases relative to simply meeting the 
performance goal. Collectively, the findings are in generally consistent with the prior 
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evidence. However, I find that inconsistent with the compensation contract design ex 
ante, there is either severe penalty for fairly bad performance or strong reward for fairly 
good performance. This evidence is consistent with recent study by Murphy and Jensen 
(2011) who argue that the typical nonlinear compensation contracts are detrimental to 
firm value by providing misleading incentives to manage earnings and to take on 
excessive (or insufficient) risk to CEOs. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 As a robustness test, I conduct common factor analysis for determinants of 
CEO pay in Table 6 following prior studies (e.g., Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 2007). 
In Table 6, Panel A, I classify the variables in previous models in six factors. 67% of the 
total variance is explained by the six factors. In Panel B, I regress CEO pay on the six 
factors that consist of the original explanatory variables to address multicollinearity 
concern. The findings are qualitatively similar to the main findings.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Then I perform direct comparisons between the impacts of determinants in 
Table 7. In Table 7, Panel A1 and A2, I classify the sample into groups of CEOs who 
miss and meet analyst forecast EPS. The executives who miss analyst forecast but meet 
their own performance goal earn significantly greater non-incentive bonus than 
executives who do not meet performance goal. In contrast, executives who meet analyst 
forecast but miss own performance goal earn less than those who also achieve their 
performance goal. In Panel B1 and B2, I divide the sample into groups of CEOs who 
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miss and who meet previous year’s EPS. CEOs who miss prior EPS but meet their own 
performance goal this year earn greater than those who miss their goal too. On the other 
hand, executives who increase EPS from the last year but miss this year’s performance 
goal earn substantially less than those who meet their performance goal. In conclusion, 
achieving executive’s own performance goal has significantly larger impacts on the 
magnitude of annual bonus than any other competing determinants of CEO 
compensation. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 Overall, I find strong evidence that performance goal achievement, either the 
continuous ratio of actual to target performance or the fact that performance goal has 
been achieved, is a major determining factor of CEO annual non-equity incentive 
compensation. The magnitude of the effect outweighs any effects of other competing 
determinants. The findings support my hypotheses that executives have strong economic 
incentives to achieve their own performance goals. In other words, performance goals 
play an influential role in executive performance evaluation and compensation and will 
be used as pivotal tool by board of directors to effectively control managers’ behaviors 
and decision-making in direction of shareholder and manager incentive alignment. 
I then examine whether shareholders indeed benefit by having executive 
compensation contracts that base performance evaluation and compensation decision on 
performance goal achievement. I analyze the effect of p-to-g on the pay-performance 
sensitivity by employing the percent to percent change model of PPS (Murphy, 1985; 
Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier, 2009): 
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Δlog(COMPit) = β0 + β1Δlog(Firm_Value)it + β2 Δlog(Firm_Value)it *(P-to-G) 
+ β3Δlog(Firm_Value)it*(d_Meet_Goal) + β4Δlog(Firm_Value)it*(D_Zone)  
+ β5Δlog(Firm_Value)it*(D_No_P-to-G) + ΣYEAR + εit                        (3) 
My measure of the dependent variable is twofold. First, annual cash CEO 
compensation is the sum of cash salary and non-equity incentive bonus (Shaw and 
Zhang, 2010). Second, annual total CEO compensation is the sum of salary, non-equity 
incentive bonus, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, Black-Scholes 
grant value of stock options, and all other compensation (Himmelberg and Hubbard, 
2000; Hall and Liebman, 1998). Following prior literature that directly estimates change 
in centered compensation, I use year-on-year change in the natural logarithm of the level 
of compensation (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman, 2006). The 
change in shareholder wealth is measured by the change in firm value (see Appendix B 
for definition). Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) compare the explanatory power and 
relevancy of various PPS measure from prior studies and argue that percentage-
percentage change model is among the most desirable empirical measures of alignment 
of manager and shareholder interests. Finally, I control for year effects that may be 
significant because the sample period spans through financial crisis era (2008-2012). 
Table 8 reports the results of model (3). I find statistically significant positive 
relationship between change in executive compensation and change in shareholder 
wealth, consistent with prior literature (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and 
Liebman, 1998). In column (2), I find results as predicted that achieving performance 
goal is positively related with pay-performance sensitivity. The result is not only 
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statistically significant but also economically meaningful. When P-to-G is taken into 
account, the PPS improves by approximately 0.5% point.
5
 This indicates that by 
exerting effort to achieve performance goal, the CEO pay is more tightly associated with 
her performance and ultimately with shareholder wealth. The stronger alignment of 
interests will mitigate agency problem and leads to improvement of shareholder value. 
The similar results are reported in Column (3) and (4). Lastly in Column (5), I examine 
whether non-disclosure firm has lower pay-performance sensitivity by including the 
indicator variable that equals 1 if P-to-G information is undisclosed. The findings are as 
predicted. However, the caveat is that there are largely two reasons behind the 
undisclosed P-to-G: Firms either do not have performance-based compensation scheme 
or simply have not disclosed their proprietary information as the disclosure requirement 
is not mandatory. The confounding reasons weaken the implication of the finding to the 
extent that there are significantly large number of firms that do not disclose their 
compensation contracts for proprietary cost reason. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
Performance goal has been regarded a pivotal element of CEO compensation contracts. 
Not many prior studies have documented implication of performance goal on CEO pay. 
                                           
5
 In Column (1), the coefficient is interpreted as 1.26% increase in non-equity compensation per 
1% increase in firm value. In Column (2), the coefficient on the interaction term indicates that 




I provide empirical evidence that performance goal has strong impact on determining 
annual non-equity incentive compensation, using the relatively large and recent sample 
of the largest U.S. companies. The results indicate that executives consider performance 
goals seriously as achieving the goals is directly related with the amount of the annual 
bonuses. Therefore, performance goals work as effective organizational control 
mechanism to align manager’s incentive with organizational goal and shareholder 
wealth. In addition, CEOs have nonlinear incentives in typical compensation contract, 
although the impact of typical nonlinear compensation contract designs tends to weaken 
in the empirical findings. Finally, I examine the hypothesis that performance goal 
improves CEO pay-performance sensitivity. I report strong evidence of improvement of 
pay-performance sensitivity by achieving performance goals. 
 Limitations of the study include relying on measured p-to-g that is confounded 
by discretionary changes in performance goal setting and compensation decision 
processes. Kim and Yang (2014) find some evidence that boards make such changes for 
the purpose of awarding CEOs some bonuses. This calls for the more detailed 
investigation of performance goal setting and performance evaluation, if current 
disclosure quality ultimately improves. Another limitation is to leave bigger part of CEO 
pay package, namely stocks and options, that is another important cause for managerial 
incentives and actions. P-to-G in my study only focuses on the decision-making around 
non-equity incentive compensation. The biggest obstacle to conduct more fruitful 
research on long-term compensation is the lack of disclosure on performance evaluation 
process. This also leads to the call for more discipline by boards in disclosing more 
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Appendix A: An excerpt from CD&A section of proxy statement, 
McKesson Corporation, FY 2011 
Management Incentive Plan (“MIP”): At its meeting in May 2010, during its annual 
review of compensation for executive officers, the Compensation Committee approved 
target awards (expressed as a percent of annual base salary), the performance measure 
and the award scale for the FY 2011 MIP. The threshold, target and maximum payouts 
for the FY 2011 MIP are displayed below in the 2011 Grants of Plan Based Awards 
Table, based on the Compensation Committee’s approval in May 2010 of an EPS target 
for FY 2011 of $4.82. 
At its meeting in May 2011, during its annual review of compensation for 
executive officers, the Compensation Committee assessed the Company’s performance 
versus the MIP performance measures approved in May 2010. For FY 2011, the 
Compensation Committee assessed the Company’s EPS performance to be $5.00 
per diluted share, which excluded $0.14 per diluted share of US Oncology acquisition-
related expenses. Consistent with its past practice, the Compensation Committee 
determined that an adjustment for acquisition-related expenses to the Company’s FY 
2011 EPS result of $4.86 per diluted share was appropriate to reflect certain unusual 
events that were not included in the Company’s FY 2011 operating plan. Since the 
Company’s FY 2011 EPS performance of $5.00 per diluted share as assessed by the 
Compensation Committee exceeded the pre-established target goal noted above by 
$0.18, all corporate employee participants were eligible to receive 123% of their 
initial MIP target cash award, in accordance with the following payout scale: 
 
EPS for FY 2011 MIP (% of annual base salary) 
$5.30 and above 200% 
$5.11 150% 
$4.82 (Performance goal) 100% 
$4.43 50% 





Appendix B: Variable definitions 
P-to-G = Actual performance divided by performance goal 
D_Meet_Goal = 1 if P-to-G is greater than or equal to 1, and 0 otherwise 
D_Area1 = 1 if P-to-G is less than minimum performance threshold, and 0 otherwise 
D_Area2 = 1 if P-to-G is greater than or equal to minimum performance threshold and 
less than performance goal, and 0 otherwise 
D_Area3 = 1 if P-to-G is greater than or equal to performance goal and less than 
maximum performance cap, and 0 otherwise 
D_Area4 = 1 if P-to-G is greater than or equal to maximum performance cap, and 0 
otherwise 
D_Zone = 1 if P-to-G is greater than or equal to minimum performance threshold and 
less than maximum performance gap, and 0 otherwise 
D_No_P-to-G = 1 if P-to-G is undisclosed, and 0 otherwise 
D_Miss_Goal = 1 if P-to-G is less than 1, and 0 otherwise 
D_Meet_Analyst = 1 if EPSt is greater than or equal to consensus analyst forecast EPS, 
and 0 otherwise 
D_Meet_Zero = 1 if income before extraordinary items is greater than or equal to 0, and 
0 otherwise 
D_Meet_Prior = 1 if EPSt is greater than or equal to EPSt-1, and 0 otherwise 
log(Non_Eq) = Natural logarithm of non-equity incentive compensation 
Δlog(Non_Eq) = Change in natural logarithm of non-equity incentive compensation 
from t-1 to t 
Non_Eq/Assets = Non-equity incentive compensation divided by total assets 
log(Total_Comp) = Natural logarithm of total compensation 
Δlog(Total_Comp) = Change in natural logarithm of total compensation from t-1 to t 
Total_Comp/Assets = Total compensation divided by total assets 
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Δlog(Firm_Value) = Change in natural logarithm of market capitalization from t-1 to t 
log(Assets) = Natural logarithm of total assets 
BM = Ratio of book value to market value of equity 
Adj_Ret = Market-adjusted rate of return of common stock 
Ownership = Percentage of CEO total shares owned excluding options 
Age = CEO’s current age 
D_Regulated = 1 if the firm is in gas, electricity, telecomm, or utility industry, and 0 
otherwise 
log(Sales) = Natural logarithm of annual net sales 
ROA = Earnings before interests and taxes divided by annual average total assets 
Tenure = Length of tenure as CEO 
G-Index = Aggregate score of the level of shareholder rights protection by Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 





Figure 1: Descriptive structure of disclosed typical annual non-
equity incentive plan 
The horizontal axis measures the degree of P-to-G, and the vertical axis shows the 
degree of non-equity incentive compensation divided by target bonus, both of a typical 
annual executive compensation plan. The descriptive data suggest that, on average, the 
sample CEOs achieve 102% of their performance goal, and as a result, receive 120% of 











Table 1: Descriptive statistics of performance goals 
Panel A: Use of performance metrics 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std 
Dev 
N 
Number of performance metrics 2.47 2 2 3 1.13 1,292 
Weight of performance metric 1 0.56 0.50 0.33 0.75 0.27 1,292 
Weight of performance metric 2 0.34 0.33 0.25 0.45 0.14 857 
 
Panel B: Performance measures 
 Metric 1 (N=1,292) Metric 2 (N=857) 
EPS-related measure 0.40 0.06 
Operating income-related measure 0.22 0.12 
Net income-related measure 0.10 0.03 
Revenue-related measure 0.07 0.35 
EBITDA-related measure 0.04 0.01 
Cash flow-related measure 0.01 0.20 
Other measures 0.17 0.23 
Total 1.00 1.00 
 
Panel C: P-to-G by performance metric 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
Metric 1 (N=1,292) 1.06 1.02 0.96 1.11 0.35 
Metric 2 (N=857) 1.07 1.01 0.96 1.11 0.54 
Metric 3 (N=405) 1.04 1.03 0.96 1.15 0.96 
Difference of p-to-g between Metric 1 and 2 -0.03 (t-statistic = -0.85) 
Difference of p-to-g between Metric 2 and 3 0.02 (t-statistic = 0.37) 
Difference of p-to-g between Metric 3 and 1 -0.01 (t-statistic = -0.14) 
 
Panel D: P-to-G by threshold 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
d_Area1 0.09 0 0 0 0.29 
d_Area2 0.27 0 0 1 0.44 
d_Area3 0.42 0 0 1 0.49 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics of sample data 
Panel A: Classification of annual CEO compensation 










































Panel B: Firm characteristics 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev N 
Sales ($ millions) 20,419 8,414 4,365 17,639 42,401 1,292 
Total assets ($ millions) 26,731 12,004 6,038 28,487 54,711 1,292 
Book-to-market ratio 0.46 0.41 0.26 0.61 0.28 1,292 
Return on assets 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.06 1,292 
Adjusted stock return 0.05 0.02 -0.12 0.19 0.26 1,292 
 
Panel C: CEO characteristics, firm ownership, and corporate governance 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev N 
Age (years) 56.03 56 52 60 5.82 1,292 
Tenure (years) 5.73 5 2 8 4.70 1,292 
Ownership (%) 0.70 0.10 0.04 0.23 2.52 1,094 
G-Index 9.72 10 8 11 2.47 1,152 
E-Index 2.48 3 1 3 1.31 1,128 
 
Panel D: Meeting performance goals, analyst forecast earnings, zero-earnings target, and 
prior earnings  Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev N 
d_Meet_Goal 0.63 1 0 1 0.48 1,292 
d_Meet_Analyst 0.62 1 0 1 0.49 1,222 
d_Meet_Zero 0.94 1 1 1 0.24 1,292 
d_Meet_Prior 0.63 1 0 1 0.48 1,292 
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Table 3: Univariate Pearson correlation coefficients matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) log(Non_Eq) 1.00                  
(2) log(Total_Comp) 0.35 1.00                 
(3) P-to-G 0.30 0.15 1.00                
(4) d_Meet_Goal 0.32 0.15 0.53 1.00               
(5) d_Meet_Analyst 0.25 0.10 0.28 0.44 1.00              
(6) d_Meet_Zero 0.10 0.03 0.23 0.16 0.10 1.00             
(7) d_Meet_Prior 0.16 0.08 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.20 1.00            
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0.02 0.68 1.00 
 
Bold coefficients correspond to 5 percent significance level. See Appendix B for variable definition. 
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Table 4: Multivariate OLS regression model results for determinants of CEO pay 
COMPit = β0 + β1P-to-Git + β2D_Meet_Analystit + β3D_Meet_Zeroit + β4D_Meet_Priorit + β5log(Assets)it + β6log(Sales)it + β7BMit + β8ROAit + β9Adj_Retit  
+ β10Ownershipit + β11Ageit + β12Tenureit + β13D_Regulatedit + β14G_Indexit + ΣYear + εit                                                      (1) 
Year-fixed effects are included. t-statistics are heteroskedasticity-consistent and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent significance levels, respectively, for two-tailed tests. See Appendix B for variable definition. 
 (1) log(Non_Eq) (2) Non_Eq/Assets (3) log(Total_Comp) (4) Total_Comp/Assets 
P-to-G 2.153*** (5.56) 132.047*** (5.29) 0.153*** (3.23) 0.066 (0.75) 
d_Meet_Analyst 1.019*** (4.18) 47.589*** (2.82) 0.077** (2.00) 0.133* (1.89) 
d_Meet_Zero 0.239 (0.36) -77.589*** (-2.85) -0.014 (-0.17) -0.167 (-1.41) 
d_Meet_Prior 0.295 (1.20) 4.408 (0.26) 0.051 (1.40) -0.022 (-0.31) 
log(assets) 0.397* (1.77)   0.288*** (8.44)   
log(sales) 0.016 (0.08) -76.311*** (-11.01) 0.053* (1.73) -0.372*** (-15.55) 
BM -0.678 (-1.06) 10.829 (0.30) -0.330*** (-4.13) -0.174 (-1.62) 
ROA -0.418 (-0.20) 14.563*** (5.07) 0.358 (0.77) 0.048*** (5.32) 
Adj_Ret 0.360 (0.79) 80.285** (2.35) -0.029 (-0.38) 0.117 (1.11) 
Ownership -0.360*** (-3.49) -3.588 (-0.77) -0.077*** (-3.25) -0.025** (-2.30) 
Age 0.017 (0.74) 1.079 (0.88) 0.001 (0.41) -0.004 (-0.68) 
Tenure 0.008 (0.24) 9.462*** (2.58) 0.010 (1.64) 0.034*** (2.73) 
d_Regulated -0.135 (-0.41) -63.055*** (-3.98) -0.361*** (-6.96) -0.448*** (-7.50) 
G-Index 0.051 (1.11) -3.152 (-1.20) 0.021*** (3.44) 0.011 (0.99) 
Intercept -0.017 (-0.01) 1622.880 (9.80) 7.700 (17.15) 9.066 (14.62) 
No. of observations 944 944 944 944 
Adjusted R
2
 0.19 0.33 0.41 0.36 
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Table 5: Nonlinearity model results for determinants of CEO pay 
 
COMPit = β0 + β1D_Meet_Goalit + β2D_Area1it + β3D_Area2it + β4D_Area4it 
+ β5D_Meet_Analystit + β6D_Meet_Zeroit + β7D_Meet_Priorit + β8log(Assets)it + β9log(Sales)it  
+ β10BMit + β11ROAit + β12Adj_Retit + β13Ownershipit + β14Ageit + β15Tenureit + β16D_Regulatedit 
+ β17G_Indexit + ΣYear + εit                                                      (2) 
 
Year-fixed effects are included. t-statistics are heteroskedasticity-consistent and reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively, for two-tailed tests. See Appendix B for variable definition. 
 log(Non_Eq) Non_Eq/Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
d_Meet_Goal 1.747***  91.699***  
 (6.61)  (5.61)  
d_Area1  -6.255***  -118.746*** 
  (-6.32)  (-4.59) 
d_Area2  -0.586**  -55.183*** 
  (-1.97)  (-3.48) 
d_Area4  0.610***  92.107*** 
  (3.53)  (3.71) 
d_Meet_Analyst 0.703*** 0.272 33.199** 31.750** 
 (2.82) (0.92) (2.13) (2.03) 
d_Meet_Zero 0.591 -0.697 -55.121** -45.757 
 (0.90) (-0.83) (-2.09) (-1.47) 
d_Meet_Prior 0.292 -0.008 5.799 9.170 
 (1.19) (-0.03) (0.35) (0.66) 
log(assets) 0.339 0.051   
 (1.51) (0.18)   
log(sales) 0.040 0.227 -76.951*** -65.973*** 
 (0.21) (1.04) (-10.95) (-8.34) 
BM -0.458 0.104 23.487 3.733 
 (-0.72) (0.15) (0.65) (0.13) 
ROA -0.335 0.036 14.797*** 11.823*** 
 (-0.16) (0.01) (5.15) (5.76) 
Adj_Ret 0.322 0.999* 81.691** 62.666** 
 (0.72) (1.90) (2.36) (2.09) 
Ownership -0.357*** -0.241** -3.379 1.186 
 (-3.60) (-2.10) (-0.73) (0.22) 
Age 0.020 0.054** 1.173 2.934** 
 (0.84) (2.15) (0.94) (2.13) 
Tenure 0.006 -0.012 9.445** 2.265 
 (0.18) (-0.35) (2.57) (1.27) 
d_Regulated -0.422 -0.028 -80.148*** -81.201*** 
 (-1.28) (-0.07) (-4.56) (-4.94) 
G-Index 0.060 0.000 -2.440 -0.062 
 (1.34) (0.00) (-0.95) (-0.02) 
Intercept 1.523 5.496 1687.2 1446.649 
 (0.54) (1.50) (10.02) (7.29) 
     
No. of observations 944 559 944 559 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.34 0.33 0.40 
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Table 6: Common factor analysis results for determinants of 
CEO pay 
 
Panel A: Measurement model 
Factor  Component 
loading 
Factor  Component 
loading 
performance goal achievement  economic factor  
 P-to-G 0.773  log(Assets) 0.865 
 d_Meet_Goal 0.910  log(Sales) 0.665 
 d_Area1 -0.435  BM 0.696 
 d_Area2 -0.702  ROA -0.662 
 d_Area4 0.677  Adj-Ret -0.317 
other goal achievement  CEO factor  
 d_Meet_Analyst 0.738  Ownership 0.630 
 d_Meet_Zero 0.490  Age 0.712 
 d_Meet_Prior 0.779  Tenure 0.807 
industry factor  governance factor  
 d_Regulated 1.000  G-Index 0.906 
 
Panel B: Structural model 
 log(Non_Eq) log(Total_Comp) 
perf_goal_ach 1.142*** (6.77) 0.096*** (3.40) 
other_goal_ach 0.401** (2.46) 0.085*** (2.97) 
econ_factor 0.310* (1.71) 0.237*** (7.16) 
ceo_factor -0.099 (-0.49) -0.063 (-1.23) 
industry_factor -0.025 (-0.18) -0.146*** (-6.24) 









     
Number of observations 559 559 
Adjusted R
2
 0.16 0.18 
Variance Inflation Factor 1.26 
 
Year-fixed effects are included. t-statistics are heteroskedasticity-consistent and reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, 





Table 7: Comparison between effects of competing determinants 
on non-equity incentive compensation using subsamples of 
meeting analyst forecast and prior earnings 
Panel A1 
   
  
Subsample: 
Miss analyst forecast 
Dependent variable: log(Non_Eq) log(Total_Comp) 
N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
d_Meet_Goal 168 14.06 2.54 15.99 0.65 
d_Miss_Goal 295 11.30 5.41 15.83 0.73 
Difference 
 








   
  
Panel A2      
Subsample:  
Meet analyst forecast  
Dependent variable log(Non_Eq) log(Total_Comp) 
N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
d_Meet_Goal 604 14.43 1.77 16.06 0.60 
d_Miss_Goal 155 12.98 3.81 15.88 0.65 
Difference  1.45 2.34 0.18 0.61 
t-statistic  4.62*** 3.11*** 
F-statistic  4.60 1.16 
  
   
  
Panel B1      
Subsample:  
Miss prior earnings 
Dependent variable log(Non_Eq) log(Total_Comp) 
N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
d_Meet_Goal 219 14.12 2.44 15.99 0.65 
d_Miss_Goal 264 11.48 5.33 15.83 0.71 
Difference  2.64 4.27 0.15 0.68 
t-statistic  7.20*** 2.49** 
F-statistic  4.76 1.16 
  
   
  
Panel B2 
   
  
Subsample:  
Meet prior earnings 
Dependent variable log(Non_Eq) log(Total_Comp) 
N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
d_Meet_Goal 597 14.39 1.98 16.07 0.61 
d_Miss_Goal 212 12.39 4.49 15.85 0.71 
Difference 
 










The final full sample is divided into each subsample by the following criteria: (Panel A1 and A2) 
“Miss analyst forecast,” if actual EPSt < analyst forecast consensus EPSt, or “Meet analyst 
forecast,” if actual EPSt ≥ analyst forecast consensus EPSt (Panel B1 and B2) “Miss prior 
earnings,” if EPSt < EPSt-1, or “Meet prior earnings,” if EPSt ≥ EPSt-1. t-statistics are Satterthwaite 
variance estimator, assuming unequal variances of two compared groups. *, **, and *** 
correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. F-values are 
folded F-statistics and ratios of sample variances. See Appendix B for variable definition. 
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Table 8: Estimates of pay-performance sensitivity 
Δlog(COMPit) = β0 + β1Δlog(Firm_Value)it + β2 Δlog(Firm_Value)it *(P-to-G) + β3Δlog(Firm_Value)it*(d_Meet_Goal) + β4Δlog(Firm_Value)it*(D_Zone)  
+ β5Δlog(Firm_Value)it*(D_No_P-to-G) + ΣYEAR + εit                                                                                 (3) 
 
 Δlog(Non_Eq) Δlog(Total_Comp) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Δlog(Firm_Value) 1.260*** 0.595 1.014 2.062*** 2.352*** 0.139** 0.264* 0.240* 0.346** 0.252*** 
  (4.12) (0.69) (1.30) (2.90) (5.35) (2.43) (1.70) (1.85) (2.30) (2.83) 
Δlog(Firm_Value)*(P-to-G)  1.769***     -0.011    
   (2.74)     (-0.09)    
Δlog(Firm_Value)*(D_Meet_Goal)   2.136**     0.016   
    (2.50)     (0.11)   
Δlog(Firm_Value)*(D_Zone)    1.777*     -0.209  
     (1.89)     (-1.09)  
Δlog(Firm_Value)*(D_No_P-to-G)     -
1.806*** 
    -0.163* 
     (-3.45)     (-1.65) 
Intercept 0.065 -0.368 -0.352 -0.735 -0.046 0.024 0.032 0.031 0.068 0.017 
 (0.26) (-1.31) (-1.46) (-2.00) (-0.18) (0.48) (0.60) (0.59) (0.84) (0.33) 
           
No. of observations 1,469 1,078 1,078 643 1,469 2,318 1,291 1,291 753 2,318 
Adjusted R
2
 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Year-fixed effects are included. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, 





최고경영자 성과보상계약 중 성과평가의 기준이 되는 성과목표는 
최고경영자의 경제적 동기를 조직의 그것과 일치 시킴으로써 경영자의 경영 
노력을 조직의 목적에 부합하는 방향으로 이끌어내는 역할, 즉 대리인비용 
발생을 억제하는 역할을 한다. 본 연구는 이와 같은 선행 이론연구 결과를 
실증하고, 나아가 실제 최고경영자 성과보상계약에서 성과평가와 보상이 
어떻게 이루어지는지 분석한다. 첫째, 최고경영자의 성과보상은 애널리스트 
주당순이익 예상치, 상대적인 과거 이익수준, 절대적인 흑자를 각각 
달성하는 것보다 이사회가 부여한 성과보상계약 상의 성과목표를 달성하는 
것에 더 강하게 연관되어 있다. 그 연관된 정도는 선행연구에서 밝힌 
최고경영자 성과보상의 주요 결정요소들인 기업 규모, 기업 성과, 산업군, 
최고경영자 특성, 기업지배구조 등을 통제하고도 통계적, 경제적으로 
유의하다. 둘째, 성과목표 달성 수준과 성과보상 간에 비선형관계를 
발견하였다. 최고경영자의 성과보상은 최고경영자가 성과목표를 달성하는지 
여부와 성과목표 달성수준이 보상계약 상 어떤 사분선에 위치하는지에 
비선형적으로 연관되어 있다. 따라서 최고경영자는 성과보상계약에서 명시한 
성과목표 수준과 구체적인 계약 내용 및 형식에 따라 각기 다른 경제적 
동기를 갖는다. 이는 실적과 성과보상 간 선형관계를 가정한 다수의 
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선행연구에 반하는 실증결과이다. 셋째, 최고경영자 성과보상과 주주 이익 
간 관계의 밀접함(“Pay-Performance Sensitivity”)은 최고경영자가 
성과목표를 달성할 때, 성과목표 달성도가 높을 때 그리고 성과보상계약이 
정한 구체적인 경제적 유인 구간(“Incentive Zone”) 내에 있을 때 더 높다. 
본 연구는 미국 S&P 500대 기업의 최고경영자들이 어떻게 평가되고 보상 
받는지의 실체에 접근한다는 점에서 의미가 있다. 결론적으로, 성과보상계약 
내 성과목표는 기업 이사회가 최고경영자를 통제하는 데 유용한 도구가 되며 
궁극적으로 주주 이익을 증진하는 데 쓰이고 있음을 밝힌다. 
 
주요어: 성과목표; 최고경영자 성과보상; 성과보상과 주주 이익 간 민감도. 
학번: 2012-20453. 
 
